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TWO WORLDS OF CIVIL
DISCOVERY: FROM STUDIES OF COST
AND DELAY TO THE MARKETS IN
LEGAL SERVICES AND LEGAL REFORM
BRYANT G. GARTH *
The recent studies of civil discovery by the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice' and the Federal Judicial Center' ("FJC") establish beyond any
reasonable doubt that we have two very distinct worlds of civil discov-
ery. These worlds involve different kinds of cases, financial stakes,
contentiousness, complexity and—although not the subject of these
studies—probably even lawyers. The ordinary cases, which represent
the overwhelming number, pass through the courts relatively cheaply
with few discovery problems. The high-stakes, high-conflict cases, in
contrast, raise many more problems and involve much higher stakes.
It is therefore essential to understand the distinction and to try to
explain why it operates. Unfortunately, despite the quality of the RAND
and FJC studies, they do not help us to gain a strong empirical under-
standing of the rarifled world of big cases and big lawyers. Empirical
studies of cost and delay have a limited power to explain the markets
that generate the high-stakes, high-conflict cases. Nevertheless, we can
suggest some preliminary explanations, and some research approaches
that might help provide this necessary context for a better-informed
debate.
One of the challenges for researchers is to get beyond the infor-
mation that tends to be produced by the elite lawyers themselves or by
lawyers and journalists parroting those lawyers. The available informa-
tion, unfortunately, typically lines up according to professional and
client interests. Each side provides an almost stylized account of the
world of big litigation—alleged "strike suits" and settlements induced
* Director, American Bar Foundation. BA., Yale University, J.D., Stanford Law School, Ph.D.,
European University Institute in Florence. Prior to commencing work at the A.B.F., he was Dean
of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
3 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGE-
MENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF TIIE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA (1998),
reprinted in 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998) (in this issue) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
2 See Thomas E. Wiliging et al, Federal Judicial Center, An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998) [herein-
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by the "blackmail" of discovery expense on one side, alleged "stone-
walling," hiding documents and harassing the plaintiffs on the other.
These adversarial positions, which are extensions of the positions that
each side argues in court, tend to dominate debate. There are at least
two consequences of this dominance. The first is that the voices of
those who either do not litigate in the federal courts or, if so, do not
constitute the legal elite, tend not to get heard. Their particular com-
plaints or lack of complaints go unnoticed. The empirical studies, in
fact, serve to give them a voice that they otherwise might not have had.
The second consequence, which is related but more subtle, is that
the reform agenda may be distorted by the domination of the para-
digm promoted collectively by the contending elites. It is relatively easy
to see that each side is seeking to shape the agenda to be favorable to
its own particular interests. The danger is to let the partisan fights fool
us into missing the complementary positions in the debates. These
elite lawyers—despite or perhaps even because of their very visible
fights—produce a view of the world that serves to shape it toward their
collective interests. Both of these consequences support the necessity
for a research strategy that can address both the market for legal
services and the market for reform.
The first part of this Article will highlight and compare the RAND
and FJC studies. These are important studies, and it is useful to make
clear what they have shown. There are several notable differences
between the studies and in the policy implications that seem to emerge
from them, but the overwhelming lesson is that the current system of
discovery in the federal courts works well for the vast majority of cases.
The RAND and FJC data also provide some material for address-
ing the questions of the high-stakes, high-conflict cases, but the data
provide only a beginning for an understanding of the two worlds of
discovery. Going somewhat beyond the data, I will offer a theoretically
derived hypothesis that the two general kinds of cases can best be
explained as the result of two different legal services products. De-
pending on the clients and the cases, the product that is purchased
will be either a variety of routine litigation or a product associated with
litigation as warfare. Clients or referring lawyers select their lawyers
according to the stakes as they perceive them and as they want their
adversaries to see them. This market hypothesis, I suggest, explains a
number of the otherwise puzzling findings of the two studies.
The next part of this Article will elaborate this working hypothesis
and suggest some means to investigate it further. In terms of contem-
porary social science, I am suggesting a more institutional focus than
the approaches characteristic of the RAND and FJC surveys. This kind
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of focus—which requires a combination of social science theory and
aggressive journalism—could help us understand much better the
systems of incentives that lead to particular investments in civil discov-
ery. One key to this research is to move beyond the federal rules and
issues of cost and delay to research about more fundamental issues in
the evolving market for legal services—and legal reform.
Finally, shifting the analysis' slightly, my conclusion will return to
the question of the framing of the issues in debates about discovery
reform. Civil discovery is a major problem by definition: the key legal
actors in the debates—lawyers and judges—all report serious dissatis-
faction. The challenge is to recognize the conflict but also understand
the various biases in the framing of the issues. If we get lost in the
debates conducted by the elite partisans, we run the risk of enacting
reforms that are useless, harmful or even inimical to fundamental legal
values. Social science research along the lines I suggest can supplement
the RAND and FJC studies 'to provide a different and hopefully strong
new entry into the market of ideas about civil discovery reform.
I. TWO EMPIRICAL STUDIES —THE BASIC PICTURE OF CIVIL
DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL COURTS
The best way to see the power of the conclusions of the two studies
of cost and delay is to review what they did and what they found. The
RAND study builds its detailed analysis out of a selection of the cases
used for the evaluation of the Civil Justice Reform Act. It is based on
5222 cases filed in the 1992-93 period in twenty federal districts. The
investigators sent questionnairei to lawyers and judges involved in the
cases, and they received responses from 67% of the judges and 47%
of the lawyers. In real terms, 4061 lawyers out of 9423 responded. The
percentage is not as high as we would like for the lawyers, but we do
not have evidence of any particular bias in the characteristics of re-
spondents versus non-respondents.
Most of the analysis presented in this study of discovery is based
on two aspects of the data—the lawyers' reports of the hours that they
worked, and certain objective aspects of the cases as determined from
the case files and interviews. The governing ideas are that lawyer time
is the best indicator of cost, and that lawyers are probably able to give
fairly reliable counts of their own hours.s
3
 There are no doubt other costs that may not be captured by this figure (paralegals,
secretaries, costs borne in-house by company personnel), but it would add further uncertainty to
try to get lawyers to provide this information about others,
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The RAND statistics on discovery must be placed in the context
of the cases they examined and those they left out. The RAND study
excluded from the sample cases those "that usually receive minimal or
no management," defined to mean "prisoner cases . , administrative
reviews of Social Security cases, bankruptcy appeals, foreclosure, for-
feiture and penalty, and debt recovery cases."4
 It is worth noting that
these are cases that involve quite a number of individuals, and indeed
they represent a substantial portion of the civil docket. Second, the
RAND study eliminated from the discovery analysis the one-quarter of
cases in its sample that closed before the issue was joined. No discovery
took place in those cases. Third, the median discovery in the one-quar-
ter of cases that concluded after the issue was joined but prior to 270
days after filing was only three hours.
Over half of the RAND sample—which excluded "minimal man-
agement cases"—thus involved little or no discovery on the way to some
kind of resolution. Overall, as the report states, "lawyer work hours are
zero for 38 percent of general civil cases, and low for the majority of
cases. "5
The 45% of cases that were terminated after issue was joined and
after 270 days from the filing date provided most of the discovery
activity. From the RAND sample, data were available on 1624 cases that
fell into this category. The median number of hours spent on discovery
in these cases was still relatively low. The 20 hours represented one-
fourth of the median lawyer work time of 80 hours.
We now begin to see the importance of the high-stakes, high-
conflict cases. The pull of the big cases is evident from the fact that
the mean number of hours on discovery was 83 and the total number
of hours 232, a somewhat higher discovery hours-to-total-hours ratio.
The median was much lower than the mean.
Given the weight and significance of a relatively low percentage
of cases, it is also useful to examine the top ten percent of the cases in
terms of discovery. The median for those 162 cases in discovery hours
was 300 and for total hours was 950. This figure represents fifteen times
the median for discovery of the active cases. Again, however, the mean
is much higher than the median even for this top ten percent. The
mean number of hours was 601 for discovery and 1452 for total hours.
A rather small number of cases thus generated a very large amount of
discovery.
4 RAND REPORT, supra note 1, § I(C) (2) n.7.
5 Id. § 11(A).
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The FJC study followed a somewhat different methodology. The
investigators began with 1000 cases closed in the last quarter of 1996.
In selecting their cases, they also excluded a relatively high percentage
of the federal civil docket—"Social Security appeals, student loan col-
lections, foreclosures, default judgments and cases that were termi-
nated within sixty days of filing." 6 They were blessed with a very high
response rate by the attorneys that they sought to sample. For the 1000
civil cases, they wrote to the 2000 attorneys they identified from the
cases and they received responses from 1178-59%. Unlike the RAND
analysis, the FJC based its analysis on the lawyer reports of the actual
costs of litigation. As we shall see, this method provides a quite com-
parable picture to what was reported in the RAND study.
The FJC reported that the median in costs was a total of $13,000
per client, with roughly half of those costs spent on discovery. Interest-
ingly, as a rough comparison to RAND, we can divide the FJC figure
by the RAND median hours-80—and get a billing rate that would be
$160 per hour. The top 5% of the FJC cases involved total costs of
$170,000 per client, which at $160 per hour would be just over 1000
hours, which again is roughly comparable to the picture given by
RAND. We can confirm the act of a relatively small number of huge
cases with great amounts of discovery and expense.
Another perspective on these high-stakes, high-conflict cases
comes from the description of the eightieth percentile (in overall
expense) of cases in four categories—antitrust, patent, securities, and
trademark. These categories tended to create high costs according to
the FJC. The number of cases in this group was quite small, repre-
senting 4.5% of the sample or 53 cases out of the 1178. The total
expenses on discovery per client of the cases at this percentile were
$305,000, with depositions comprising $135,000.
These major studies thus establish the point that the problem of
civil discovery is not a phenomenon of ordinary federal civil litigation.
Most of the federal cases are still relatively circumscribed, and there
are quite a few "minimal management" cases in the system. The RAND
median for the active cases was 80 hours of lawyer work and 20 hours
of discovery. It is true that there could be other expenses in ordinary
litigation not captured by the RAND focus on lawyer time, but there
is no doubt that lawyer time remains the largest expense in litigation.
The high-stakes, high-conflict cases generate many lawyer hours, con-
siderable overall expense and—worth noting—high lawyer revenues.
6 FJC Study, supra note 2, at 528.
602	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:597
This story's emphasis on the importance of the ordinary cases is
completely consistent with other studies of federal and state litigation.
The Civil Litigation Research Project ("CLRP"), centered at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin in the late 1970s, similarly found that the median
number of lawyer hours per client in a federal case was 45. 7 The
median stakes as defined in the CLRP were only $15,000. It is sig-
nificant that the stakes clearly have risen over the past fifteen years,
and lawyer time has risen with the stakes. The point here, however, is
that the major problems mainly occur outside of the ordinary course
of federal litigation.
Unfortunately, while we have identified the unique importance of
the relatively few cases in creating the "discovery problem," we do not
know as much about the very large and complicated cases as we would
like. Aggregate studies of federal litigation can only say so much about
these problematic cases, and therefore we cannot account very easily
for the source of the reported problems or even the expense. We know
only that the stakes are very high, that they are deemed to be more
complex and that they are also characterized as more contentious.
The evidence also supports the idea that these are precisely the
cases handled by the elite national bar—which is the group that tends
to dominate meetings organized to discuss problems with civil discov-
ery. The two studies do not precisely correlate particular lawyers or
types of lawyers with the cases in the samples. The RAND study states
only that there was more likely to be discovery conflict and expense in
cases involving lawyers from law firms with more than five lawyers—we
would like more precision in these numbers. The study also suggests
that 20% of the cases in the sample involved lawyers from law firms
with more than fifty lawyers.
Despite no specific focus on lawyers, the introduction to the
RAND Report raises the issue of whether, in certain cases, litigants may
prefer to hire "larger firms to handle the more complex and more
costly cases." This suggestion in my opinion is the key to under-
standing the phenomenon of the two worlds of civil litigation.
As Wayne Brazil suggested in a Chicago study in the early 1980s, 9
the phenomenon , may be an aspect of the "two hemispheres" of the
7 For the CLRP data, see HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDI-
NARY LITIGATION 86 (1990).
8 RAND REPORT, supra note 1, § MG).
9 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems,
and Its Abuses, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789 (1980); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines:
Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J.
217 (1980).
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legal profession described in the Heinz and Laumann study of the
Chicago bar published in 1982.' 0 The essential idea was that there are
two entirely different sectors of the bar—one serving personal plights,
the other handling business problems. Before elaborating some of the
implications of this suggestion, it is useful to see how it can explain
some of the seemingly contradictory or paradoxical findings of the two
studies.
Both studies, for example, addressed the issue of mandatory early
disclosure, seeming to come to very different conclusions. The FJC
study suggests some enthusiasm for mandatory early disclosure. Almost
40% of the respondents, for example, thought that it decreased the
expenses of the client. In contrast, the RAND study was very skeptical
about any benefits of mandatory disclosure. The study reports that
cases with early mandatory disclosure had no significant difference
in the number of hours worked or the time to disposition. The FJC
study found more negatives associated with early mandatory disclosure
mainly with the very large and contentious cases. The differences
might be explained by the more objective measures of the RAND study,
but we can perhaps do better by focusing on timing and the nature of
the markets.
The RAND study, it may be recalled, is older than the FJC study.
It tracked cases filed in 1992-93, whereas the FJC examined cases
closed in the last quarter of 1996. Most of the RAND cases were
completed well before late 1996. For reasons already suggested, it is
likely that the tuning was especially important for the ordinary cases.
The ordinary cases had relatively few problems to begin with, and early
mandatory disclosure undoubtedly caused some adjustment difficulties
(captured by RAND). But since this area of practice is characterized
by more cooperation in managing the scope of the case, the lawyers
could adjust. They probably became more familiar with the procedure
and therefore more accepting by the time of the FJC study. The process
may indeed have saved some time and money, but more relevant is the
fact that lawyers incorporated it into their way of handling the ordinary
cases.
In the high-stakes, high-conflict cases, however, early mandatory
disclosure (along with everything else) was simply another matter for
conflict. The lawyers reported little success with the new procedure in
those cases, and it is not surprising that the reform was unable to
reduce discovery expenses substantially.
10 See LOAN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: TILE SOCIAL. STRUCTURE
OF TILE BAR (1982).
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The division between the ordinary cases and the high-stakes, high-
conflict cases may also help explain other findings. The RAND study,
for example, found that "the requirement of a discovery/case manage-
ment plan is beneficial in reducing time to disposition, especially if a
trial schedule is not set early."" The result was slightly different for the
more complex cases: "the top 25% most costly cases appear to espe-
cially benefit from the early setting of a trial schedule (early manage-
ment of those top 25% of the costly cases without a trial date scheduled
was not associated with significantly reduced time to disposition). "12
Further, "cases that are high in complexity, high in discovery difficulty,
or high in stakes appear to benefit especially from the use of discov-
ery/case management plans."
Consistent with our working hypothesis of the existence of two
types of cases and lawyers, early management without an early trial date
did not save in costs (i.e., lawyer hours worked) for those high-stakes
cases. The lawyers who handle these cases know how to turn manage-
ment in their interests. They still work the hours they would have
worked and litigate with a strategy of no-holds barred. But case man-
agement with a trial date works better with this elite group. The
pressure of time facilitates a reduction in the lawyer time that can be
invested.
Curiously, however, the ordinary cases were more likely to termi-
nate sooner if there was case management without an early trial date.
One hypothesis consistent with the story so far is that these lawyers will
only invest so much in a case, and judicial management may raise the
costs and make a negotiated settlement occur sooner. These lawyers,
as suggested, are more likely to cooperate (toward resolution) once
they have invested a reasonable amount and learned enough of the
other's case. An early trial date, however, may lead some lawyers to
focus their investment on preparation for the trial—even if the likely
result is still a negotiated resolution with roughly the same amount of
lawyer investment as there would be in a case resolved more in the
shadow of discovery.
Finally, the RAND study also found that the shortening of the
discovery cutoff date was a kind of "win-win" solution since it reduced
the commitment of lawyer time and therefore the expense of litigation
generally." This finding may be true in all cases, but note that the
11 RAND REPORT, supra note 1, § 111(B) (2).
"Id.
" Id.
14 See id. § 111 (G).
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implications arc different in our two types of cases. In the high-stakes,
high-conflict cases, the time limitations probably reduce the possibili-
ties of conflict and therefore what could be characterized as "waste"
(even though clients are willing to pay for it in the particular case). In
the ordinary cases, however, the result might be that reduced invest-
ment saves money by cutting out some of the factual investigation that
might contribute to a fair resolution. If the ordinary cases had no
problems to begin with, this seemingly "win-win" solution might not be
a real improvement—even if it successfully reduces costs.
To summarize, the pattern is consistent with the observation that
lawyers in the ordinary cases have learned how to manage time and ex-
pense. They have had to do so, since their clients will not pay for
scorched earth tactics. On the other hand, the high-stakes, high-
conflict cases involve clients who pay for the services of lawyers as
warriors, and that is what they usually get. In terms of the legal services
market and the civil discovery problem, it appears that clients seek the
elite of the bar only when they believe that the nature of the problem
and the stakes are sufficiently high to justify a major investment in legal
services (or, in the contingent fee area, are sufficient for the lawyer to
invest substantially in the case). It is likely that only a fraction of lawyers
can claim the fees or attract the cases that justify (in terms of the
stakes) investment in litigation as full-scale warfare, characterized by
numerous depositions, discovery conflicts, charges of stonewalling and
the like, but these lawyers are very prosperous and very prominent. As
noted before and discussed more below, these are typically the lawyers
who haVe the national reputations that also make them appear at
conferences and on committees examining questions of civil discovery.
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR A COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH AGENDA
There is a kind of impasse at this stage of the research and politics
of civil discovery reform. The ordinary cases work pretty well as far as
the empirical evidence tells. We know that the lawyers in the high-
stakes, high-conflict cases claim to have enormous problems, and the
evidence confirms dissatisfaction, delay and expense associated with
these cases. The temptation therefore is to try to find some way of
reforming the rules of discovery to solve this very contentious problem.
The obvious danger, however, is that reforms designed for the relatively
few cases will impose burdens on the more ordinary cases. For a
number of reasons, therefore, it would be useful to know more about
the markets and institutional settings that produce these cases.
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The kind of research that is called for is both more institutional
and more historical, trying to capture the way that the institutions are
changing over time in relation to internal structures and external
transformations in the state and the economy. I have conducted re-
search consistent with this approach, but I cannot claim to have done
the research that would answer the questions that I have about civil
discovery.' 5 I will therefore make what I hope will be educated specu-
lations about the complex and so far not well-studied institutional
worlds of lawyers, courts, and litigation. At the very least, the specula-
tions suggest what an approach seeking to go beyond the federal rules
and questions of expense and delay might reveal.
The first requirement of this research is to reject the tendency—
typical in debates about civil discovery and procedural reform—to
assume that "civil litigation" has meant the same thing forever.' 6 We
know that different types of cases come into the system at different
times, however, and the same type of case may be enormously complex
and difficult at one time and routine at another time.'? Of particular
importance is the fact—often stated but not often taken into account—
that high-stakes business litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon.
As Marc Galanter and others have shown, major corporations did not
sue each other until the 1960s and 1970s; and, when they did, they
transformed the world of large corporate law firms that served them. 15
Litigation became prestigious and extremely lucrative. Corpora-
tions were willing to pay for anything that would work to eliminate a
competitor, prevent a merger or acquire a prize prey. Lawyers escalated
their tactics and the clients paid for that escalation. One indicator of
the change over time is the fact that in Chicago in 1994, there were
four times as many corporate litigators as there were in 1974. 19 There
was a boom in high-stakes, high-conflict corporate litigation, and it
translated into considerable soul searching about the costs of litigation
and discovery abuse—and a very prosperous decade for large law
firms.
15 See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTII, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION AND TIIE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).
I C See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and
Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 L. & Soc, INQUIRY 285 (1996).
17 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 100-13 (describing how commercial arbitration
became more routine).
IS
	 eg., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991); William E.
Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City, 1%0-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413
(1990).
19 Preliminary data from John Heinz, reporting on an American Bar Foundation project
about change in the Chicago Bar from 1975 to 1995.
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At the same time, the rise of corporate litigation helped to pro-
mote the status of in-house counsel. More money was being spent on
litigation and legal affairs, and that made corporate counsel more
important. During the 1980s, the new breed of corporate counsel
recognized that the "arms race" in business litigation needed to be
curbed, and, working through the Center for Public Resources, the
organization of corporate counsel and other entities, they got to know
each other and also exchanged ideas on how to control the expense
of litigation—and the litigators. They learned increasingly how to man-
age with less investment in scorched earth litigation as a tactic in
business warfare.
But there are still cases—probably different ones in the late
1990s—where businesses are willing to invest in full-scale warfare, and
for those cases they turn to the elite litigators who are now very
well-trained and well-armed. Perhaps the class action resurgence ex-
emplifies this new generation of "uncontained" litigation, now that
mergers and acquisitions are now much more routine and peaceful.
Whatever the character of the current high-stakes, high-conflict cases,
we can be sure that the current practice arrangements also will not
stand still. They will evolve with or without reform of the federal rules,
and the evolution of the market might even cut into the prosperity of
the elite litigators.
The likely trajectories of litigation practices could be better under-
stood if we knew more about how cases get into the rarified world of
elite lawyers and high-stakes, high-conflict litigation. It is obviously not
simply a matter of the size of the investment or deal. What shapes the
stakes is the difference between what one side will pay and the other
will accept. It is as much a matter of collegiality and communication
between potential adversaries—informal rules—as about any other
indicator of financial stakes or the formal rules of procedure. Better
personal relations and communication can mean the difference be-
tween warfare and managed dispute resolution.
For these reasons, it is difficult for reformers to assert with any
confidence that cases that are classified a certain way—whether busi-
ness litigation, products liability, or something else—are going to rep-
resent the cases of high conflict. The FJC study suggests that antitrust,
patent, securities and trademark are in this high-conflict category for
the moment, but the situation will undoubtedly change. Rules that
single out such categories are doomed to mistakes. Once matters
become more routine, they no longer require the services of the elite,
highly expensive and highly skilled national bar. The top litigators
608	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 39:597
move on to new topics and new kinds of conflicts, or they drop out of
the elite category.
In order to understand these transformations and the general
phenomenon, it is not enough to focus on the federal rules, lawyer
attitudes and the issues of cost and delay. It is necessary to understand
better the legal services market. If there is an elite sector, as the
available evidence suggests, how do particular cases reach these law-
yers, and how are decisions about the investment in litigation made—
by clients and by lawyers? Rather than assume that there are "abuses"
that need to be regulated, it may be more fruitful to ask why highly
professional, well-trained lawyers find it in their interests, and in those
of their clients, to engage in what—from outside—appears to be liti-
gation warfare. And why do their clients make the investment? It is
possible that the clients are deluded, investing more than they thought
would be optimal at the outset, but it is probably more likely that the
sophisticated clients—or, in the case of referrals from other attorneys,
peer lawyers—have good information about how to select the particu-
lar combination of lawyer and legal services. In the high-stakes world
of personal injury litigation, networks of referrals probably assure that
certain cases get to certain attorneys. 20
Similarly, if the ordinary cases seem to be handled in a more stable
and less adversarial manner, how does the market produce these re-
sults? Again, it is probably not very helpful to assume that these lawyers
are more ethical or professional than the others. It makes more sense
to see how the lawyers in both types of cases operate in the context of
their law firms and their clients. One benefit of these kinds of analyses
is that it puts the economic and other incentives for behavior in clear
focus. From this kind of perspective, it may be completely under-
standable why some lawyers—acting on behalf of their clients—turn
invitations to cooperate into opportunities for conflict (and lawyer
fees), while others need no invitations to cooperate to manage the case
jointly in the interests of a reasonable result.
This focus also looks outside of the lawyer practices to the clients
who retain them. The business settings of clients change. In some
business environments, the incentive is to fight with all the tools avail-
able—"lawyers, guns and money." In others, the incentive is to contain
the conflict, manage the expenses, and find a result in a relatively short
20 See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, American Bar Foundation, That's 95% of the Game,
Just Gelling the Case: Markets, Norms and How Texas Plaintiffs' Lawyers Get Clients 10-26 (paper
prepared for the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, St. Louis, May 26-June
2, 1997) (on file with the BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW).
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period of time. The federal rules, lawyer ethics and the pressure for
billable hours are all factors that may be important, but we must
recognize also that the client has much to say about what the lawyers
do and how they do it. Clients with more sophisticated general coun-
sel—now much more common than in the past—are also better able
to understand and control their lawyers—for good or evil.
An institutional focus is also helpful in assessing the role of judges.
My focus has been on the political economy of lawyers, but it also may
be helpful to situate judges in a kind of market setting. 21 For example,
the FJC study found that the most favored solution to discovery prob-
lems was to increase the availability of judges or magistrates to solve
discovery problems. 22 There is certainly a common sense appeal to the
idea that judicial or magistrate availability helps both resolve and
prevent disputes, and several participants at the conference at Boston
College Law School stated that their own experiences supported that
idea. But obviously judges and magistrates are either not embracing
this finding, or, if they are, the impact has not been felt in many of the
very large and hotly contested cases. If judges complain about lawyer
tactics and discovery abuse, why do they not act more aggressively to
stop it?
The answer is probably found in the sets of incentives and oppor-
tunities that shape judicial behavior. There has no doubt been a major
shift in the incentives that ambitious judges face. Once, their careers
depended on the quality of their opinions and their olympian detach-
ment from the proceedings. Now, judges are judged by how they
process cases, and the incentive is not necessarily favorable to involve-
ment in the details of discovery disputes. Again, however, the incentives
may be changing.
One evident change is in what is considered as the paradigmatic
case for the federal courts. By paradigmatic case, I mean the case that
is in the minds of those who are imagining what the federal courts are
supposed to do. This vision of proper cases is in the minds of judges
and, as I will suggest below, also lawyers. A generation ago the paradig-
matic case was the civil rights case celebrated by such writers as Abram
21 See generally Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure
and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1997).
22 See FJC Study, supra note 2, at 542. The FTC study, however, sought to measure objectively
what difference certain judicial behavior made in time and expense, and the finding was that
early management with planning saved expense, while early management without planning was
more expensive. The difference was not huge, however, and might even be explained by the [act
that planners tended to he more available to the lawyers for discovery disputes.
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Chayes, Owen Fiss and later Judith Resnik. 23 Fiss argued that business
cases did not even belong in the federal courts, since they did not
require judges to elaborate legal values. Probably, the participants in
discussions about the reform of the rules and the conduct of litigation
in the 1970s focused on the civil rights cases and on the lawyers who
handled them.
The focus has changed, as has the role of the state and business,
and the paradigmatic case now appears to be the high-stakes, high-
conflict business dispute or products liability case. This change—if I
am right—has major implications that are not addressed at all by the
literature. Instead, we find, the debates are conducted as if litigation
remains the same throughout history, and that what really matters is
fine-tuning the federal rules to plug loopholes. Indeed, the debate is
also framed in terms of how the results can be measured in terms of
time and expense. The debates would be much better informed if we
had systematic information about the changes and how they have
proceeded.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND LEGAL VALUES
This kind of empirical research is important because it allows us
to get a much better picture of what is happening and what is at stake
in debates about reform. I will suggest a few examples in the nature of
a conclusion. First, if it is true that the agenda for reform and the vision
of civil litigation have changed, shifting the focus to the high-stakes,
high-conflict cases at the expense of the ordinary cases, it is useful to
remember who is left out of the discussion. Those who are now using
the federal courts effectively with relatively few problems of discovery
abuse should not be forgotten, nor should those who do not now have
access to first-class justice.
It is not only a matter of who is left out of the discussion and may
be hurt by "reform." It is also a matter of keeping the courts available
for future changes. From a long-term perspective, it is important that
the courts not be locked into the agenda and vision of litigation that
is dominant at a particular time. The central position of the federal
courts in the United States comes from the fact that they have been
able to shift their roles to accommodate different social and economic
agendas with different cases and types of conflicts. Listening only to
" See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1986).
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the elite at any particular time will distort the reform process. Although
some distortion is natural, we have to remember that the importance
of the federal courts comes from avoiding the uncritical adoption of
one vision—no matter how many voices seem to call for that vision.
In this respect, the adversarial nature of the debate may be quite
misleading. Each side takes a strong position on behalf of their own
practice and clientele, condemning the other side for discovery abuse,
stonewalling, strike suits or other misconduct. The different sides fight
over the rules of the game in order to better their own positions. It is
tempting to think that this adversary presentation exhausts the argu-
ments pro and con, suggesting that the solution is to find a way to
bridge the voices. If both sides are in fact operating with the same
paradigmatic vision of what the federal courts should be, however, the
conflict may be a kind of charade. It has the effect of promoting
competing reforms that only serve one vision of the federal courts. The
debate itself helps to build courts that serve the interests mainly of
those who are conducting the debate.
We should also be careful to remember that there is more to
reform than "problems" and "solutions" framed in terms of cost and
delay. I have so far emphasized that there are relatively few discovery
problems in the ordinary cases, but I would rather have some deeper
knowledge to back that assertion. If there is a tacit understanding not
to invest too much or behave too adversarially in these cases, there may
be some hidden costs from that informal system of regulation. It is
probably fair to assume that the clients in these cases are able to
monitor their lawyers reasonably well, but better information would
tell us more about lawyers, clients and the investment in litigation.
Suppose that the high-stakes, high-conflict cases start to settle
down. The costs appear more manageable and the time to resolution
shortens. It would be tempting to celebrate whatever reform "pro-
duced" this felicitous result. It is possible, however, that as the elite
lawyers get to know each other better, they may work out some infor-
mal rules in the interests of all attorneys and perhaps some or all of
the clients. If this development means the same results as before, it
would be difficult to find grounds to criticize. But if, for example, the
result is that class action settlements are good for class action lawyers
and contrary to the interests of class members, then the outcome is
more problematic. We would like to know more about the conduct of
the litigation and also what role the judges actually played.
The idea behind the research is that we cannot ascertain whether
the result is fair or just—admittedly difficult terms—until we know
more about the behavior of those involved in bringing the lawsuits to
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a close. If we know the economic and other incentives that shape the
behavior, we are less likely to be fooled by what sometimes may be
nothing more than self-serving rhetoric. Social scientific research, of
course, also has its limits, and its own self-serving rhetoric, but it could
serve to bring new concerns and insights that, at the very least, can
open the discussion to a broader and more fundamental set of issues.
The two important studies establish that there are two worlds of civil
discovery, but research on the markets that produce those worlds is
necessary to understand why we have particular problems—and why
we have so much trouble inventing and imposing certain solutions.
